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The Effectiveness of International Human
Rights Pressures: The Case of Argentina,
1976-1983
David Weissbrodt*
and Maria Luisa Bartolomei**
One significant gap in the burgeoning academic literature
of international human rights law is the lack of research re-
lated to the impact of international and national procedures on
the actual protection of human rights.' It is remarkable that al-
* Briggs & Morgan Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. This Es-
say served as the basis of the Briggs & Morgan Professorship of Law inaugural
lecture on October 5, 1989. The authors wish to acknowledge helpful com-
ments from Katherine Brennan, Octavio Carson, Christina Cerna, Paul Fraser,
Marketa Freund, Carolyn Glick, Robert Hudec, Garrison Kaufman, Beverly
Keene, John Mandler, Frank Newman, Nigel Rodley, Sonia Rosen, Ron
Schlatter, and Kathryn Sikkink.
** Candidate for LL.D. degree, University of Lund, Sweden. This Essay
took as a point of departure: M. Bartolomei, Gross and Massive Violations of
Human Rights in Argentina, 1976-1983 (1990) (draft LL.D. thesis in Interna-
tional Law, University of Lund, Sweden).
1. A few scholars have begun to explore this uncharted territory with
varying success: E. LANDY, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL SUPERVI-
SION: THIRTY YEARS OF I.L.O. EXPERIENCE (1966); V. LEARY, INTERNATIONAL
LABOR CONVENTIONS AND NATIONAL LAW: THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE AUTO-
MATIC INCORPORATION OF TREATIES IN NATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEMS (1982); A.
SCHMID, RESEARCH ON GROSS HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS (1989); Berg,
Human Rights Sanctions as Leverage: Argentina, A Case Study, 7 J. LEGISLA-
TION 93, 111-12 (1980); Martin & Sikkink, U.S. Policy and Human Rights in
Argentina and Guatemala, 1973-1980, in INTERNATIONAL BARGAINING AND DO-
MESTIC POLITICS: AN INTERACTIVE APPROACH (P. Evans, H. Jacobson & R.
Putnam eds. forthcoming 1991); Sanders, The UN Working Group on Indige-
nous Populations, 11 HUM. RTS. Q. 406, 422-27 (1989) (concerning Bangladesh);
Shelton, Utilization of Fact-Finding Missions to Promote and Protect Human
Rights: The Chile Case, 2 HUM. RTS. L.J. 1 (1981); Suter, Campaign Against
Torture: The Effectiveness of Amnesty International, SOCIAL ALTERNATIVES,
vol. 1, nos. 6/7, 1980, at 39; Weissbrodt, International Trial Observers, 18 STAN.
J. INT'L L. 1, 110-14 (1982); K. Sikkink, The Influence of U.S. Human Rights
Policy on Argentina and Guatemala (draft memorandum, July 1989); see also
B. CARTER, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC SANCTIONS (1988); L. KAPUNGA, THE
UNITED NATIONS AND ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST RHODESIA (1971); Mac-
Donald, Economic Sanctions in the International System, in CAN. Y.B. INT'L
L. 61, 80 (1969); Taubenfield & Taubenfield, The "Economic Weapon": The
League and the United Nations, 58 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 183, 184-86 (1964).
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most no academics or activists have even attempted to assess
the effectiveness of human rights measures. Of course, demon-
strating effectiveness in any area of human endeavor, particu-
larly international human rights work, is very difficult. Many
human rights advocates investigate abuses and write letters to
governments because they believe that speaking out is better
than remaining silent in the face of repression. When chal-
lenged, they can also point to anecdotal evidence of prisoners
that have been released, torture that has stopped, and execu-
tions that have been prevented. More formal proof of results,
however, is much more difficult to find.
This Essay focuses on human rights abuses perpetrated by
the Argentine government from 1976 to 1983, and international
efforts to halt those abuses. The Essay principally compares
the effectiveness of the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights of the Organization of American States with the impact
of several United Nations bodies in regard to human rights in
Argentina. There are at least two reasons for selecting the case
of Argentina to assess the effectiveness of human rights pres-
sure. First, an indispensable historical record exists on events
in Argentina during the relevant period. The Argentine gov-
ernment made considerable efforts at least for the first several
years after 1983 to investigate what happened.2 The trials of
some of the leaders who were responsible3 for the abuses ad-
duced much evidence, and many of the victims wrote accounts
of their experiences. 4 Furthermore, extensive scholarly litera-
ture documents the period,5 although this Essay is the first to
correlate human rights efforts with results. Second, relatively
reliable statistics exist about disappearances, the most preva-
lent form of human rights abuse.6 Such statistics permit an an-
alyst to track the prevalence of abuses against the human rights
measures.
The difficulties in this analysis, however, are impressive.
2. See, e.g., ARGENTINE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE DISAPPEARED,
NUNCA MAS (1986).
3. See, e.g., AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, ARGENTINA: THE MILITARY JUN-
TAS AND HUMAN RIGHTS, REPORT OF THE TRIAL OF TIE FORMER JUNTA MEM-
BERS, 1985 (1987) (AI Index: 13/04/87) [hereinafter AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL,
JUNTA TRIAL].
4. See, e.g., J. TIMERMAN, PRISONER WITHOUT A NAME, CELL WITHOUT A
NUMBER (1981).
5. See, e.g., A. FONTANA, FUERZAS ARMADAS, PARTIDOS POLITICOS Y
TRANSICION A LA DEMOCRACIA EN ARGENTINA (1984).
6. See, e.g., Report of the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary
Disappearances, at 21, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1986/18 (1986).
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No one has systematically interviewed the high government of-
ficials or the less well known perpetrators of human rights
abuses to learn why they started killing people and why they
stopped. Moreover, many different influences can affect a gov-
ernment's conduct. External pressures are often far less signif-
icant than internal events.7 In the case of Argentina, Ronald
Dworkin wrote: "The junta's power was finally broken, not by
any domestic or international concern about human rights, but
by its own economic and, in the end, military ineptitude."s
Dworkin's belief in part reflects the popular view that the 1982
war in the South Atlantic brought down the Argentine military
government.9 Dworkin realized, however, that the disappear-
ances had ended far earlier in 1979. The question is why did
they end? There is no simple answer.
This Essay first reviews the human rights situation in Ar-
gentina. Part II then identifies early indications of the crisis
that prompted international measures. Part III describes the
responses of various organizations to the situation in Argentina.
This section notes the efforts of Argentine organizations to re-
spond to the disappearances and other violations; it also relates
the activities of international nongovernmental organizations in
alerting the world community to the Argentine crisis. Part III
further describes the factfinding and reporting process of the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and assesses the
United Nations response. Finally, the Essay compares the ef-
fectiveness of these various international measures toward the
prevention of human rights abuses and suggests which meas-
ures apparently led to the cessation of disappearances in
Argentina.
I. THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN ARGENTINA
On March 24, 1976, a military coup overthrew the govern-
ment of Maria Estela Martinez de Peron with the objective of
7. Issues as to whether trade, aid, or other human rights measures might
involve impermissible intervention into the internal affairs of other nations or
might constitute impermissible coercion at international law fall outside the
scope of this Essay. See U.N. CHARTER art. 2, paras. 3, 4, 7; see, e.g., R. HIGGINS,
THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH THE PoLTIcAL ORGANS
OF THE UNITED NATIONs 58-130 (1963); M. KAmNGA, INTER-STATE AccOUNT-
ABILITY FOR VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS 127-91 (1990); Bowett, Interna-
tional Law and Economic Coercion, 12 VA. J. INT'L L. 245 (1976).
8. Dworkin, Introduction, in ARGENTINE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE
DISAPPEARED, supra note 2, at xv.
9. AMERICAs WATCH, TRUTH AND PARTiAL JUSTICE IN ARGENTINA 8
(1987).
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stabilizing the economy and suppressing "leftist subversion."'10
During a "Process of National Reorganization," the military
government in Argentina dissolved the Congress and other leg-
islative bodies, dismissed judges - including judges of the
Supreme Court with life tenure - and authorized the ruling
Junta to appoint new members of the Supreme Court and Pres-
ident General Jorge Rafael Videla to appoint lower federal
court judges."1 It also suspended political activity, political par-
ties, trade union rights, and constitutional rights; decreed "anti-
subversive" statutes; and authorized the military to arrest "sub-
versives."'12 Initially, the military government focused its re-
pressive measures against the members of "guerilla groups"
and militant groups in factories. The "dirty war," however,
soon extended much further: during 1976 and 1977 it is esti-
mated that the military government imprisoned, tortured,
killed, or caused the disappearance of thousands of persons.13
More than eighty percent of these victims were between the
ages of twenty-one and forty, thus illustrating that the govern-
ment's principal target was younger people. 14 Another source
estimates that, from 1976 to 1983, approximately 12,000-15,000
persons disappeared in Argentina.'5 In addition to the disap-
10. Id. at 4-5.
11. id.
12. The authors recommend the new book I. GUEST, BEHIND THE DISAP-
PEARANCES, ARGENTINA'S DIRTY WAR AGAINST HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE
UNITED NATIONS (1990), that tells the full dramatic story of the disappeared
and the international efforts to respond to their plight. See also D. PONEMAN,
ARGENTINA: DEMOCRACY ON TRIAL 21-107 (1987); J. SIMPSON & J. BENNETT,
THE DISAPPEARED AND THE MOTHERS OF THE PLAZA 33-113 (1985); Pion-Ber-
lin, The Fall of Military Rule in Argentina: 1976-1983, 27 J. INTERAMERiCAN
STUD. & WORLD AFF. 55, 57 (1985); J. Marie Griesbraber, Implementation by
the Carter Administration of Human Rights Legislation Affecting Latin
America (1988) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis).
13. The National Commission Concerning the Disappeared identified
8,960 persons who had disappeared during the period 1973 through 1983 and
whose fate had not been ascertained by November 1984. COmiSION NACIONAL
SOBRE LAS DESAPARICION DE PERSONAS, NUNCA MAS 16 (1985). The Commis-
sion documented the greatest number of disappearances during 1976 and 1977.
Id at 298. Data concerning the number of habeas corpus petitions filed during
this period indicate a similar pattern. During the years 1976 through 1979 the
courts received 5,487 petitions on behalf of prisoners. This number can be
compared to the period 1973 through 1975 when 1,089 petitions were filed or
the period 1980 through 1983 when 2,848 petitions were submitted. I& at 401.
14. Id. at 294. Over 30% of the disappeared were workers; nearly 18%
were other employees; over 20% were students; over 10% were professionals;
and the remainder included journalists and housewives. Id at 296.
15. There remains a divergence of views as to the number of disappeared.
Americas Watch and Amnesty International have accepted the 12,000-15,000
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peared persons thousands of Argentine nationals were ac-
knowledged by the government to be in detention. For
example, in January 1978, the Argentine government admitted
that it was holding 3,472 persons under preventive detention.' 6
Many of those prisoners were tortured, killed, or both.17
II. FOREIGNERS CAUGHT IN THE NET
The families of the many young people who were abducted
during the "dirty war" tried to discover what happened to those
who disappeared. The families sought explanations from the
Argentine authorities, but the authorities refused to acknowl-
edge that they had custody or knowledge of the individuals who
disappeared.
Publicity of foreign abductions gave the outside world its
first indication of what was occurring in Argentina. For exam-
ple, Gwenda Loken Lopez, a Minnesota native who had mar-
ried a young Argentine lawyer, was abducted in April 1976,
tortured, and then released in September 1976 after Represen-
tative Donald Fraser of Minneapolis obtained the intercession
of Alejandro Orfila, the Argentine Secretary-General of the Or-
ganization of American States.' 8 Father Patrick Rice, an Irish
priest working in Argentina, was detained in October 1976 and
later released due to the efforts of the Irish government.19
Dagmar Hagelin, a seventeen-year-old with joint Swedish and
Argentine nationality, was shot, wounded, stuffed in the trunk
of an automobile, and abducted by a group of men outside the
estimate. The Center for Legal and Social Studies, the Mothers of the Plaza
de Mayo, and the Servicio Paz y Justicia continue to cite the 30,000 estimate
that was commonly used during the period 1976 through 1983.
16. LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS, VIoLA-
TIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN ARGENTINA:. 1976-1979, at 35 (1979). At the time
of the March 24, 1976, coup the government was already holding at least 5,182
detainees under the National Executive Power (PEN).
17. ARGENTINE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE DISAPPEARED, supra note
2, at 209-34.
18. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS. HUMAN RIGHTS AND U.S.
POLICY. ARGENTINA, HAITI, INDONESIA, IRAN, PERU, AND THE PHILIPPINES, RE-
PORTS SuBMrrE To THE HOUSE COMM. ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 2
(Committee Print 1976) [hereinafter REPORTS]; American is Abducted in Ar-
gentina, N.Y. Times, Sept. 17, 1976, at A3 (regarding abduction of Patricia
Erb); de Onis, Argentina Beset by Arrest Queries, N.Y. Times, Aug. 13, 1976, at
A5, col. 1; de Onis, U.S. Priest is Arrested at Argentine Seminary, N.Y. Times,
Aug. 6, 1976, at A2, col. 3 (regarding arrest of Father James Weeks); Ex-Min-
neapolis woman jailed in Argentina, Minneapolis Trib., May 18, 1976, at 8A,
col. 3.
19. See 124 CONG. REC. 22,959 (1978).
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home of one of her friends on January 27, 1977.20 Hagelin's
Swedish father sought the assistance of both the Swedish Am-
bassador to Argentina and the Swedish government. Later the
Swedish media took up the case.2 1
Publicity concerning the disappearance of two French nuns
brought more attention to the deteriorating Argentine situa-
tion. Sister Alice Domon, forty-years old, was abducted on De-
cember 8, 1977, in Buenos Aires, after a mass had been said for
the thousands of disappeared persons in Argentina.22 Sister Le-
onie Duquet, sixty-one years old, was detained on December 10,
1977.2 The Argentine government's refusal to acknowledge
their detention prompted the French government and the
French media to seek information on the whereabouts of the
two French nationals.2 4 While their fate is still unknown, there
is some evidence that they were killed by being thrown from an
airplane into the sea.2
After March 1976, a considerable number of refugees from
other countries in Latin America, who had previously sought
refuge in Argentina, were abducted. Some were returned forci-
bly to their countries of origin where they suffered persecution,
while others were threatened with abduction or refoulement
(forced return to their countries). 26 The United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees sought to protect the refugees in
Argentina, to obtain their release, or to find new homes for
them in other countries.2 7
20. INTER-AMERIcAN COMMISSION ON HumAN RIGHTS, REPORT ON THE SIT-
UATION OF HuMAN RIGHTS IN ARGENTINA at 67-69, OAS Doc.
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.49, doc. 19, corr. 1, (1980) [hereinafter INTER-AMERICAN COM-
MISSION REPORT].
21. AMERICAS WATCH, supra note 9, at 41-43. The Argentine government,
however, refused to acknowledge any information about Hagelin's wherea-
bouts. One of Hagelin's friends witnessed her abduction by Navy Captain Al-
fredo Astiz, but the place and time of her death remain unknown. Id
22. INTER-AMEmICAN COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 20, at 102-03.
23. Id.
24. ARGENTINE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE DISAPPEARED, supra note
2, at 353.
25. AMERICAS WATCH, =upra note 9, at 44.
26. I. GUEST, supra note 12, at 63-64.
27. See, e.g., AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, REPORT OF AN AMNESTY INTERNA-
TIONAL MISSION TO ARGENTINA, 6-15 NOVEMBER 1976, at 56-62 (1977) (AI In-
dex: PUB 68/00/77) [hereinafter AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, MISSION]; INTER-
AMERICAN COMMIssION REPORT, supra note 20, at 105-11.
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III. RESPONSES OF VARIOUS ORGANIZATIONS TO
THE ARGENTINE CRISIS
A. THE ROLE OF ARGENTINE NONGOVERNmENTAL
ORGANIZATIONS
In addition to the publicity from the abduction of foreign-
ers caught in the ever-widening net of repression, several orga-
nizations in Argentina drew national and international
attention to the human rights violations. For example, in April
and May 1977, several women whose children had been ab-
ducted began to hold vigils in the Plaza de Mayo directly across
from the President's residence. The women, called Mothers of
the Plaza de Mayo, received considerable attention from the in-
ternational media. During October and November 1977, an-
other group of women organized themselves as the
Grandmothers of the Plaza de Mayo. The two organizations be-
came known for their courageous vigils that continually pro-
vided a public witness to the plight of the thousands of
disappeared persons and their families. 28
Other Argentine organizations brought attention to their
country's violations. These groups include the Permanent As-
sembly for Human Rights, established in 1976 prior to the mili-
tary coup and comprised of politically diverse members, the
Ecumenical Movement for Human Rights, composed of repre-
sentatives of various religious denominations, and the Argen-
tine League for the Rights of Man, formed in the 1930s. 29 The
Permanent Assembly for Human Rights, in cooperation with
the Argentine League for the Rights of Man, the Ecumenical
Movement for Human Rights, and the Committee of Families
of Persons who have Disappeared or have been Detained for
Political Reasons, produced several lists of the thousands of in-
dividuals who disappeared after 1975. The October 1978 list
contained 4,881 names and the May 1979 list contained 5,818
names.30 The groups submitted the lists to the Argentine au-
thorities, but the government confiscated publications contain-
ing the lists and forbade their distribution.3' In addition, on
several occasions the Argentine authorities seized the offices of
the organizations, their publications, and bank accounts.
28. I. GUEsT, supra note 12, at 53-57.
29. ARGENTINE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE DIsAPPEARED, supra note
2, at 421.
30. ARGENTINE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE DISAPPEARED, supra note
2, at 421.
31. INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 20, at 257-59.
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The Center for Legal and Social Studies (CELS), formed in
1979, and the Servicio Paz y Justicia also worked against the re-
pression in Argentina. Furthermore, as early as July 1976, the
Roman Catholic Church in Argentina expressed concern about
the killing of priests32 and the widespread human rights
abuses.33
Finally, some Argentineans were able to leave the country
and complain about the situation in their homeland. 4 For ex-
ample, the Argentine Commission for Human Rights, which
had representatives in Geneva, Madrid, Mexico City, Paris,
Rome, and Washington, D.C., presented testimony during hear-
ings on September 28-29, 1976, before the House Subcommittee
on International Organizations,35 and on April 25, 1977, before
the Senate Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance.36 The Argen-
tine Commission successfully sought the cutoff of United States
military aid to the Argentine government, as will be discussed
more fully below.
B. THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL NONGOVERNMENTAL
ORGANIZATIONS
Several international nongovernmental organizations re-
ceived information about the abuses in Argentina. Some sent
factfinding visits to the country and issued significant reports
that drew the attention of the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights of the Organization of American States and the
United Nations, as well as alerted the international media
Among the most visible nongovernmental organizations were
Amnesty International, which visited Argentina in November
32. de Onis, Argentine Leader Meets Bishops on Slayings, N.Y. Times,
July 23, 1976, at A3, col. 6; Pope Calls for 'Explanation' of Priests' Deaths in
Argentina, Wash. Post, Sept. 28, 1976, at A10, col. 1.
33. Terror in Argentina, N.Y. Times, July 30, 1976, at A20, col. 1; Freed,
Argentine Bishops Break Silence On Killings, Minneapolis Star, July 31, 1981,
at 10A, col. 1.
34. Argentine Refugees: An Appeal to the U.N., Argentina Outreach:
Bulletin of the Argentine Information and Service Center 7 (Jan.-Feb. 1977).
35. Human Rights in Argentina: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Inter-
national Organizations of the House Comm. on International Relations, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1977) (statement of Gustavo Raca, Member, Argentine
Commission for Human Rights).
36. Security Assistance Authorizations: Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Foreign Assistance, Subcomm. on Africa, and Subcomm. on Arms Contro,
Oceans, and International Environment of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Rela-
tions, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 180 (1977) (prepared statement of the Washington
Information Bureau of the Argentine Commission for Human Rights).
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1976,37 the International Federation of Human Rights, which
sent a delegation in January 1978, and the Lawyers Committee
for Human Rights, which went on a factfinding visit in April
1979.
Soon after the coup Amnesty International began to re-
ceive information about individuals who had disappeared, been
arrested, tortured, and/or killed.38 In August 1976, the organi-
zation issued a summary of testimonies of torture and detention
in Argentina. Amnesty International also issued urgent ap-
peals to its members to write to the Argentine government, re-
questing cessation of the violations. The Argentine government
received thousands of letters from Amnesty International
members, principally from Europe, but also from other
countries.
It is uncertain why the Argentine government accepted the
November 1976 Amnesty visit. Perhaps it believed that it could
thereby learn what Amnesty International knew and what its
sources of information were. Amnesty International selected
prominent delegates who gave visibility to the visit. They in-
cluded Lord Avebury, a member of the British House of Lords,
Father Robert Drinan, a member of the United States House of
Representatives, and Patricia Feeney, a British member of the
Research Department of the Amnesty International Secreta-
riat.39 The delegates met with numerous high ranking officials,
although not with President Videla.40 Twenty plainclothed po-
lice officers constantly followed the delegates and later ques-
tioned, intimidated, and even detained individuals who met
with the delegates.4 ' The Amnesty International representa-
tives also received testimony from torture victims.42 The most
common torture methods included electric shocks with a prod,
immersion of the head in water, covering the head with a wet
cloth to make breathing almost impossible, beatings, keeping
the prisoner hooded, forcing prisoners to stand in awkward po-
sitions for hours, depriving prisoners of food, drink, and sleep,
and sexual abuse, including rape.43 In addition, the delegates
received personal testimony from the relatives of more than
37. Id. at preface.
38. I&
39. IAL
40. Id.
41. AmNFSTY INTERNATIONAL, MISSION, supra note 27, at 18.
42. Id- at 20-21.
43. Id. at 37.
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one hundred individuals abducted by government agents."
Amnesty International published a report of its visit in
March 1977. The report described the new repressive legisla-
tion45 and estimated that there were between 5,000 and 6,000
political prisoners, at least two-thirds of whom had not been
charged but were being detained incommunicado and indefi-
nitely under the National Executive Power.46 Amnesty Inter-
national also reported that the most quoted figure for
disappearances in Argentina at that time was 15,000.47
Reporting later, Amnesty International summarized its ef-
forts during this period:
In 1978, in view of continuing evidence of widespread "disappear-
ances" in Argentina, Amnesty International launched a world-wide
publicity campaign to bring pressure on the Argentine government to
end its policy of systematic abduction and to acknowledge the deten-
tion of the "disappeared." In 1980 Amnesty International published a
report on secret camps in Argentina based on the testimony of former
detainees. Between 1977 and 1982, the organization sent regular com-
munications to the United Nations and the Inter-American Commis-
sion on Human Rights of the Organization of American States
documenting a consistent pattern of gross violations of human rights
in Argentina.
48
The International Federation of Human Rights in Paris
also sent a factfinding visit to Argentina on January 17-25, 1978.
The delegation included a New York judge and two lawyers
from Washington, D.C., and Paris. The delegation's purpose
was to gather information on missing persons, particularly six-
teen French citizens reportedly abducted in Argentina. The
delegation held a press conference after its return to Washing-
ton, D.C., in which it announced that Argentine authorities for
the first time had admitted holding 3,472 people in preventive
detention.
Another organization, the Lawyers Committee for Human
Rights,49 organized a factfinding delegation of the Association
of the Bar of the City of New York, with the endorsement of
the American Bar Association, to visit Argentina in April 1979,
44. I& at 28.
45. Id, at 11-16.
46. Id at 18.
47. I& at 27.
48. AMNEsTY INTERNATIONAL, JUNTA TRIAL, supra note 3, at 7.
49. The Lawyers Committee for Human Rights was initially called the
Lawyers Committee for International Human Rights and did use the "Interna-
tional" in its title at the time of its principal work on Argentina. Nevertheless,
the organization is now known by the shorter title; and, to avoid confusion,
that title is used here.
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principally to investigate the situation of lawyers there.5° They
released their report in May 1979 and submitted it to the
United Nations, in June 1979, under the confidential procedure
established by Economic and Social Council resolution 1503.
The Lawyers Committee documented the breakdown of the
legal process in Argentina from 1976 to 1979 and assembled in-
formation about individual cases of disappeared, detained, tor-
tured, and killed attorneys.
The International Commission of Jurists and its Centre for
the Independence of Judges and Lawyers also issued reports
and appeals on behalf of the lawyers, judges, and law professors
who were detained, killed, or disappeared.5 1 Indeed, as early as
March 1975, one year before the coup, the International Com-
mission of Jurists sent a delegation to Argentina to inquire into
the situation of thirty-two lawyers who were detained without
charge or trial under the state of siege imposed in 1974.52
C. INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
Beginning in 1975, before the coup, the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights received an increasing number
of complaints about human rights violations in Argentina.53 As
early as 1978, the Commission asked for permission to conduct
an on-site visit to Argentina to resolve these complaints.5
When the Commission did not receive permission to enter the
country, it began to prepare a report on the situation in Argen-
tina. The Commission informed the Argentine government of
its decision to prepare the report "in the belief that this is the
most suitable method of determining precisely and objectively
the status of human rights in a particular country at a particu-
lar time in history."55 In early 1978, the Argentine government
agreed to a visit for the limited purpose of reviewing the legal
situation. The Commission, however, refused that limitation on
50. LAWYERS ComMITTEE FOR INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS, VIOLA-
TIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN ARGENTINA: 1976-1979, at i (1979); Association of
the Bar of the City of New York, Report of the Mission of Lawyers to Argen-
tina, April 1-7, 1979, at 2-3.
51. See, e.g., Attacks on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers in Ar-
gentina, BULL. CENTRE INDEPENDENCE JUDGES & LAw., Apr. 1978, at 1-36;
BULL. CENTRE'INDEPENDENCE JUDGES & LAw., Sept. 1978, at 17; BULL. CENTRE
INDEPENDENCE JUDGES & LAw., Oct. 1978, at 3-4; Argentina, 16 REv. INT'L
COMMISSION JURISTS 1 (1976).
52. I. GUEST, supra note 12, at 20.
53. INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 20, at 1.
54. I. GUEST, supra note 12, at 173.
55. INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 20, at 1.
10191991]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
their on-site visit. Finally, in December 1978, the Argentine
government notified the Commission that it would accept a
visit following the standard Commission conditions that permit-
ted the Commission to choose its own itinerary.5
As with the Amnesty International mission, it is uncertain
why the Argentine Government accepted the Commission's
visit. Possibly the government believed that it had eliminated
its principal opposition.57 Alternatively, the United States
might have pressured Argentina to accede to the Commission's
visit. Following the coup, the State Department appealed to
the Argentine government on behalf of United States citizens
who were arrested or abducted.58 The State Department in-
formed Congress in December 1976 that the "subject of human
rights has been raised repeatedly with representatives of the
Government of Argentina during 1976 by the Department of
State and our embassy in Buenos Aires."59 Soon after Presi-
dent Carter took office in January 1977, Secretary of State
Vance announced that United States military aid to Argentina
would be reduced from $48.4 million to $15 million.60 In July
1977, Congress cut off all military aid and sales to Argentina,
effective September 30, 1978.61 During 1977 and 1978, State De-
partment officials visited Argentina on several occasions to dis-
cuss the human rights situation,62 culminating in Secretary
Vance's arrival in November 1977, when he submitted a list of
thousands of disappeared persons to the Argentine govern-
56. The visit was initially scheduled for May 1979 and then was postponed
because of the organizational changes which occurred in the Commission when
the American Convention on Human Rights came into force.
57. Patrick Flood has stated that even before the Inter-American Com-
mission on Human Rights visit, the Argentine authorities improved the physi-
cal conditions of confinement for political detainees and reports of ill-
treatment declined. Flood, U.S. Human Rights Initiative Concerning Argen-
tina, in THE DIPLOMACY OF HUMAN RIGHTS 129, 132-33 (D. Newson ed. 1986).
58. See REPORTS, supra note 18, at 2.
59. I& at 4.
60. Oberdorfer, In Rights Push, Vance Asks Cuts to Three Countries,
Wash. Post, Feb. 25, 1977, at Al, col. 3. A few days later Argentina announced
that it would not accept further military aid. Argentina and Uruguay Reject
Aid From U.S., Wash. Post, Mar. 2, 1977, at A10, col. 1.
61. International Security Assistance Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-92, § 11,
91 Stat. 619, amended by International Security Assistance Act of 1978, Pub. L.
No. 95-384, § 12(c)(1), 92 Stat. 737 (repealed 1981). Congress passed the law in-
cluding the cut-off provision on July 22, 1977, and the President signed it on
August 4, 1977. See L. SCHOULTZ, HUMAN RIGHTS AND UNrrED STATES FOR-
EIGN POLICY TOWARD LATIN AMERICA 331-32 (1981).
62. DeYoung, Carter Aide in Argentina to Gauge Rights Impact, Wash.
Post, Mar. 31, 1977, at A17, col. 5.
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ment,63 and Under Secretary of State Newsom's arrival in early
1978.
Additionally, in July 1978, the State Department indicated
that it could not recommend Export-Import (EXIM) Bank fi-
nancing for the export of Allis Chalmers generators for the
Yaciretf hydroelectric power project. 64 During the same pe-
riod, the United States began to abstain from voting on loans to
Argentina by the Inter-American Development Bank.65 In Sep-
tember 1978, however, the State Department approved the
EXIM Bank financing, apparently in exchange for the Argen-
tine government's acceptance of the Inter-American Commis-
sion visit.6 6
Before the Inter-American Commission visited Argentina,
it received briefings from representatives of several groups, in-
cluding the Mothers of the Disappeared in Argentina, other Ar-
gentine human rights organizations, Amnesty International,
and the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights. These prelimi-
nary interviews provided the Commission with information and
ideas for their agenda. Six members of the Commission (from
Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, the United States,
and Venezuela) and a staff of five visited Argentina September
6-20, 1979. They met with President Videla, other government
officials, political figures, representatives of various political
parties, representatives of Argentine human rights organiza-
tions, officials of recognized trade unions, lawyers, and others.6 7
The Commission collected numerous testimonies about viola-
tions from human rights organizations and received 5,580 com-
plaints, of which 4,153 were new.68
The Commission announced that it would receive testimo-
nies in person from victims and their families. The most dra-
matic moment of the visit occurred in Buenos Aires, when
thousands of individuals filled the street in front of the build-
ing where the Commission was hearing testimonies. That sin-
gle outpouring of victims has been credited with giving
confidence to many people to seek information concerning the
whereabouts of their relatives, thus working toward the end of
repression.
63. See de Onis, Vance Wins Argentine Pledge on Nuclear Arms, N.Y.
Times, Nov. 22, 1977, at A3, col. 1.
64. Flood, supra note 57, at 133.
65. Id at 131-32.
66. L GUEST, supra note 12, at 172.
67. INTER-AMEmiCAN COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 20, at 2-6.
68. Id at 6.
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The Commission's report detailed numerous cases in which
individuals were killed in custody.69 It also described the prev-
alent practice of abducting individuals and transferring many of
them to clandestine detention facilities. 70 The Commission re-
ferred to several specific cases, including those involving the
disappearance of pregnant women, minors (such as Dagmar
Hagelin 71), a doctor, several lawyers, and refugees from Para-
guay and Uruguay.72 The report then characterized as "unsatis-
factory" the government response to the Commission's requests
for information about the many cases.73 The Commission noted
that the government's refusal to cooperate rendered the writ of
habeas corpus ineffective.74 The Commission also stated that
newspapers failed to report the crisis and even refused to print
advertisements that included the word "disappeared. '75 While
the Commission could not cite an exact number of disappear-
ances,76 it found the most reliable source to be a list of 5,818 it
received from the Minister of Interior, prepared by the Perma-
nent Assembly of Human Rights. The government clarified
only a small number of those cases, including sixteen who were
detained, seventy-three who reappeared, and eighteen who
died.
The Commission also discussed the plight of persons in
preventive detention and the government's refusal to permit
detainees to exercise their constitutional right to choose exile
rather than indefinite detention.77 The Commission related the
conditions of confinement in several principal prisons that they
observed. Further, the Commission's report discussed viola-
tions of freedom of expression and religion, the freedom of
human rights organizations to function, labor and political
rights, and the right to fair trial.
The Commission's response to the government's argument
that repression was needed to combat terrorism was an espe-
69. Id. at 29-52.
70. Id. at 53-56.
71. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
72. INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 20, at 56-116; Exiles
in Argentina Reported Seized, N.Y. Times, July 20, 1976, at A12, col. 4; Exiles
in Argentina, Wash. Post, July 14, 1976, at A5, col. 1; de Onis, Exiles in Argen-
tina Struggle to Leave, N.Y. Times, July 9, 1976, at A6, col. 6.
73. INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 20, at 121.
74. Id. at 122-23.
75. Id. at 124-25.
76. Id. at 136.
77. Id. at 139-77.
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cially important element of the report.7 8 The Commission
stated that such a rationale could not justify the human rights
violations by the government and it would therefore not inves-
tigate the conduct of terrorists.7 9 The Commission further
stated that its mandate was "to protect individuals whose rights
have been injured by agents or organs of the State."8 0 The gov-
ernment could not answer that stance of the Commission.
The Commission's report, widely disseminated outside Ar-
gentina, was very influential in focusing world public opinion
on the human rights abuses in Argentina. The report thus
made it difficult for outsiders to claim ignorance of the Argen-
tine situation. When the Commission released the report,
newspapers in Argentina published the conclusions and recom-
mendations together with the government's reply. While the
full report was not officially available in Argentina and no
press dared to print it, 500 copies were informally distributed
and 2,000 photocopies of a clandestine edition were dissemi-
nated to newspapers, journalists, judges, bishops, members of
human rights organizations, and other individuals. Human
rights organizations in Argentina could thereby use the report
as proof of the disappearances and other rights violations, even
though it was not legally published in Argentina until January
1984.81
After the Commission's visit, disappearances in Argentina
appeared to diminish. Indeed, in September 1979, the govern-
ment stated that it "ha[d] won the war" against subversion as of
the time the Commission visited Argentina.82 The Commission
noted that "compared with 1976, 1977, and 1978, there was a
smaller number of disappeared detainees in 1979, and that since
October 1979 [just after the Commission's visit of September 6-
20, 1979], the Commission has received no new claims of disap-
pearances. 8 3 Information submitted to the National Commis-
78. Id& at 22-27.
79. I& at 25.
80. I& at 26.
81. EL INFORME PROHIBIDO, INFORME DE LA O.E.A. SOBRE LA SITUACION
DE Los DERECHOS HuMANOS EN ARGENTINA (1984).
82. INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 20, at 135. Some
sources indicate that the opposition had been suppressed by the end of 1977.
See, e.g., Note, Constitutional Ambiguity and Abuse in Argentina - The Mili-
tary Reign 1976-1983, 6 N.Y.L. SCH. HuM. RTs. J. 353, 365 (1989).
83. INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 20, at 135 (foot-
notes omitted). The Commission was disturbed that a few abductions occurred
even during the Commission's visit, but the abducted individuals were later ac-
knowledged to be in preventive detention.
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sion on the Disappeared 4 and to the United Nations Working
Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances indicates
that fewer disappearances did occur after the visit. For exam-
ple, the Working Group published a chart of the frequency of
disappearances since 1971, based on information it received.a
The following chart shows the frequency of disappearances
from 1971 through 1980, with no recorded disappearances after
1980:
YEAR MONTHS OF THE YEAR DISAPPEARANCES REPORTED
1971 5-7 2
1974 8-12 5
1975 1-4 8
5-7 10
8-12 60
1976 1-4 184
5-7 350
8-12 600
1977 1-4 338
5-7 323
8-12 280
1978 1-4 93
5-7 100
8-12 64
1979 1-4 11
5-7 12
8-12 13
1980 1-4 18
5-7 6
8-12 4
As indicated above, the cause of the virtual cessation of disap-
pearances following the Inter-American Commission's visit is
uncertain. It might have resulted from a change in political cli-
mate created by the Commission's investigation;8 6 alterna-
tively, the Argentine government's "war against subversion"
84. See supra note 13.
85. REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON ENFORCED OR INVOLUNTARY DIs-
APPEARANCES, at 21, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1986/18 (1986). But see REPORT OF THE
WORKING GROUp ON ENFORCED OR INVOLUNTARY DISAPPEARANCES at 90, U.N.
Doc. E/CN./1989/18, (1989) (graph of disappearances from 1974-1988 by quar-
ter).
The statistics listed here are derived from the 1986 chart and not from the
data used to develop the chart. Also, the disappearances reported to the
Working Group do not reflect all disappearances but only those reported.
Nonetheless, the frequency of disappearances reported to the Working Group
tracks similar data from other sources. See, e.g., supra note 13.
86. See Krause, Argentine Military Shaken By Rights Report of OAS,
Wash. Post, Jan. 23, 1980, at A24, col. 5.
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might have been near completion by the date of the visit so that
disappearances were no longer necessary.
In some ways the Argentine report represents a zenith of
the Inter-American Commission's activities. Before the Argen-
tine report, the Organization of American States (OAS) Gen-
eral Assembly discussed each of the Commission's factfinding
reports. The Argentine report, however, was the last report
that the General Assembly fully discussed. Because of the Ar-
gentine government's strong opposition to the report and the
new Reagan administration's tacit support of the Argentine
government, the report provoked much controversy when it
was discussed at the General Assembly in November 1980. As a
result, the OAS General Assembly has generally been reluctant
to adopt a resolution concerning a country that has been the
subject of Inter-American Commission scrutiny.8 7 Several
Latin American countries apparently have been concerned that
they might be the subject of negative publicity from a strong
factfinding report.88
Remarkably, the Inter-American Commission took no sig-
nificant public action against Argentina following its 1979 re-
port and the 1980 General Assembly discussion of the report,
though it could have pursued the problem of accounting for the
thousands of disappearances that still remain unresolved.8 9
Perhaps the Commission believed that the situation had so sub-
stantially improved that no further action was needed. More-
over, the change in the United States administration and its
new approach to foreign policy resulted in a decrease in the
Commission's financial resources and diminished United States
concern about human rights. Therefore, the Commission
lacked the same financial resources and political support that it
had previously enjoyed.
D. UNITED NATIONS
The United Nations (U.N.) Sub-Commission on Prevention
of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities convened for its
twenty-ninth session in August 1976, only a few months after
87. One exception was a resolution that mentioned Suriname.
88. See T. BUERGENTHAL, a. NORmS & D. SHELTON, PROTECTING HUMAN
RIGHTS IN THE AMERICAS 204-13 (2d ed. 1986); C. MEDINA, THE BATLE OF
HUMAN RIGHTS 156-57 (1988).
89. The Commission did note this problem in its report. INTER-AMERICAN
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 20, at 135. The Commission may also have
provided information to assist the prosecution of the nine military leaders in
1985. See infra Postscript.
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the March coup. Under the authority received from Economic
and Social Council (ECOSOC) resolution 1235 to examine the
violation of human rights in any part of the world,9° the Sub-
Commission adopted a resolution on August 30, 1976, expres-
sing deep concern "at reports from which it appears that basic
human rights and fundamental freedoms are at present in jeop-
ardy in Argentina."9' The resolution referred particularly to
the plight of refugees and to the June 1976 request of the U.N.
High Commissioner for Refugees for assistance in resettling
persons who previously had sought refuge in Argentina. The
Sub-Commission reported to the next session of the U.N. Com-
mission on Human Rights in February and March 1977.
From 1977 to 1979, several nongovernmental organizations,
France, Sweden, the United States, and other Western dele-
gates to the Commission on Human Rights mentioned Argen-
tina under Commission agenda item 12 authorized by ECOSOC
resolution 1235. The first delegate to refer to Argentina was
Brady Tyson, representing the new Carter administration. He
characterized the Argentine situation as more serious than
problems in Chile and Uruguay.92 The following year, former
Congressman Edward Mezvinsky, representing the United
States, expressed concern about abuses in Argentina after Ar-
gentina criticized the United States about its discrimination
against blacks.93
Also at the 1978 session, Ambassador Beaulne of Canada
called for the application of international standards to the
treatment of detainees and particularly sought procedures to
avoid disappearances. 94 His statement was motivated by an in-
vestigative mission to Argentina undertaken by three members
of the Canadian Parliament in November 1976.95 Ambassador
Soyer of France, Professor Ermacora of Austria,96 and Ambas-
sador Danelius of Sweden also briefly referred to Argentina.97
Soyer's particular concern was the fate of two French nuns who
disappeared in 1977. Similarly, Danelius's concern arose from
90. E.S.C. Res. 1235, 42 U.N. ESCOR Supp. (No. 1) at 17, U.N. Doc. E/4393
(1967).
91. Sub-Comm. Res. 2C at 44, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/sub. 2/378 (1976). The
Sub-Commission adopted the resolution by a vote of eight in favor, one
against, and eight abstaining. Id- at 2.
92. 34 U.N. ESCOR (1420th mtg.) at 6, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR.1420 (1977).
93. 34 U.N. ESCOR (1470th mtg.) at 2, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR.1470 (1978).
94. Id at 2-3.
95. 34 U.N. ESCOR (1469th mtg.) at 8, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR.1469 (1978).
96. 34 U.N. ESCOR (1468th mtg.) at 8, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR.1468, (1978).
97. Id at 5.
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the 1977 disappearance of Dagmar Hagelin.98
During the 1979 Commission session, delegates of Aus-
tria,99 Sweden,10° and the United States' 01 again discussed
abuses in Argentina, using a more global and detailed approach.
For example, Professor Ermacora of Austria stated that there
were 13,000 victims of repression, including 650 killed, 3,250 im-
prisoned, and 9,000 disappeared persons. Although those facts
were presented pursuant to ECOSOC resolution 1235 and the
Commission had received Sub-Commission resolution 2C of Au-
gust 1976, the Commission neither established a working group
to investigate the crisis as had been done for the Chilean (1975-
1979) and South African (1967-present) situations, nor took any
other action.10 2
Instead of using the more expeditious and thus usually
more effective approach available under resolution 1235, the
U.N. pursued the slower, more elaborate, and confidential pro-
cedure delineated by ECOSOC resolution 1503.103 Human
rights advocates submitted the first communications on Argen-
tina under the 1503 procedure during 1976 and 1977. The
Working Group on Communications, however, determined that
the communications did not merit transmission to the Sub-
Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of
Minorities.
During 1978 the Women's International Democratic Feder-
ation,10 4 the International Federation of Human Rights, 10 5 and
98. 1& at 5.
99. 35 U.N. ESCOR (1517th mtg.) at 5, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR.1517 (1979).
100. Id- at 3.
101. 35 U.N. ESCOR (1518th mtg.) at 11, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR.1518 (1979).
102. Under the authority of ECOSOC resolution 1235, the Commission
later developed a process for establishing special rapporteurs, special repre-
sentatives, experts, and other envoys to monitor human rights violations in
particular countries: Afghanistan (special rapporteur, 1984-present), Bolivia
(special envoy, 1981-1982), Chile (special rapporteur, 1979-1990), Cuba (delega-
tion of six members of the Commission, 1988), Democratic Kampuchea (mem-
ber of the Sub-Commission to review materias, 1980-1983), El Salvador
(special representative, 1981-present), Equatorial Guinea (special rapporteur,
1979; expert, 1980, 1984), Guatemala (special rapporteur, 1983-1985, special rep-
resentative, 1986-1987), Iran (special representative or rapporteur, 1984-pres-
ent), Poland (special rapporteur, 1982), and Romania (special rapporteur, 1989-
present). F. NEWMAN & D. WEISSBRODT, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS:
LAW, POLIcY AND PRocEss 113 (1990).
103. E.S.C. Res. 1503, 48 U.N. ESCOR Supp. (No. 1A) at 8, U.N. Doc.
E/4832/(1970).
104. Communication No. 78/6/7,782 (Feb. 20, 1978) (copy on file at the Cen-
tre for Human Rights, Geneva, Switzerland).
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Amnesty International submitted 1503 communications.106 The
Working Group on Communications, meeting in July 1978, de-
cided that these communications presented a consistent pattern
of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights.
The Sub-Commission, however, under the influence of its Ar-
gentine member, Mario Amadeo, decided in August 1978 to
keep the communications under consideration and not to trans-
mit them to the Commission on Human Rights.
After the Sub-Commission refused to act, three more
groups, the Grupo de Abogados Argentinos Exilados en
Francia,107 the Christian Democratic World Union, 08 and the
Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, submitted communica-
tions pursuant to resolution 1503.109 The Working Group on
Communications again found a consistent pattern of gross vio-
lations in these communications, in addition to three held from
1978, and transmitted all six to the Sub-Commission. On Sep-
tember 5, 1979, the Sub-Commission voted - eighteen in favor,
one (Argentina) against, and four abstaining - to send the Ar-
gentine situation to the Commission. 1 -0
During confidential sessions in February 1980, the Commis-
sion reviewed the communications referred by the Sub-Com-
mission and the Argentine government's responses to those
complaints. The Commission decided to keep the situation
under consideration, to ask several searching questions of the
Argentine government, and thus to pressure Argentina to make
improvements. At that same session, the Commission author-
ized the establishment of the U.N. Working Group on Enforced
or Involuntary Disappearances. Although designed to consider
the problem of disappearances worldwide, the Argentine crisis
motivated the establishment of the Group."1 Indeed, it was the
presence of Mothers of the Disappeared from Argentina in the
105. Communication No. 78/5/7,499 (May 19, 1978) (copy on file at the Cen-
tre for Human Rights, Geneva, Switzerland).
106. Communication No. 78/6/7,807 (June 30, 1978) (copy on file at the
Centre for Human Rights, Geneva, Switzerland).
107. Communication No. 78/10/17,777 (Sept. 5, 1978) (copy on file at the
Centre for Human Rights, Geneva, Switzerland).
108. Communication No. 79/5/4,447 (May 31, 1979) (copy on file at the Cen-
tre for Human Rights, Geneva, Switzerland).
109. Communication No. 79/6/5,081 (June 15, 1979) (copy on file at the
Centre for Human Rights, Geneva, Switzerland).
110. I. GUEST, supra note 12, at 138.
111. Kramer & Weissbrodt, The 1980 U.N. Commisson on Human Rights
and the Disappeared, 1 Hum. RTS. Q. 18, 18-19 (1981).
1028 [Vol. 75:1009
INTERNATIONAL HMAIN RIGHTS
Commission's meeting room that gave the Commission a sense
of the urgent need for action on the problem of disappearances.
There were several more 1503 communications on Argen-
tina from 1980 until 1983. The most important were from Am-
nesty International, the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights,
the Permanent Assembly for Human Rights, the Center of
Legal and Social Studies (CELS), the International Commission
of Jurists, the Argentine Commission of Human Rights, and
several individuals whose family members had been imprisoned
or who had witnessed torture and killings. For each of these
four years, the Working Group on Communications transmitted
the relevant communications to the Sub-Commission, the Sub-
Commission by consensus found a situation warranting Com-
mission attention, and the Commission kept the situation under
consideration. The high point occurred in 1980, when the Com-
missi6n not only kept the situation under consideration, but
posed several searching questions to the Argentine government
about the disappeared persons and prison conditions.1'2
For several reasons, the U.N. could not develop a sufficient
consensus to take action on Argentina during most of the 1976-
83 period. First, the U.N. normally requires a substantial fac-
tual showing to pursue action. The U.N. action therefore
stalled until the Inter-American Commission, Amnesty Inter-
national, the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Pax
Christi, Argentine human rights organizations, and other
groups published persuasive reports. Second, under the 1503
procedure, the U.N. must establish a consistent pattern of relia-
bly attested gross human rights violations, which required a
factual showing that was not available until about 1979.
Third, the Argentine ambassador, Gabriel Martinez, was
experienced and effective in using U.N. procedures to block ac-
tion by the Commission on Human Rights." 3 Fourth, Argen-
112. U.N. Doc E/CN.4/R.57 (1980); U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/R.541 (1980); M.
Bartolomei, suzra note **, at 65.
113. Ambassador Martinez was so influential that he claimed responsibility
for having Theo van Boven fired in 1981 as Director of the U.N. Human
Rights Division, because van Boven had encouraged the establishment of the
U.N. Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances. Interviews
with T. van Boven, Apr. 1988 & Aug. 1989; see also I. GUEST, su1pra note 12
(detailing, inter alia, van Boven's fall from power). In 1983 Emilio Mignone of
the Center of Legal and Social Studies in Buenos Aires came to the Commis-
sion on Human Rights and spoke on behalf of the International Commission of
Jurists. I. GUEsT, supra note 12, at 329-30. A representative of the Mothers of
the Disappeared spoke for Pax Christi. When Mignone began his speech, Ar-
gentine Ambassador Martinez objected strenuously to his presentation and
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tina's influential role in its own region and throughout the
world reinforced Martinez's work. Governments were reluc-
tant to take a stand against a Third World country that, unlike
Chile, had important friends. Also, Argentina cared about its
world image and struggled to present a favorable case against
U.N. action. Accordingly, Argentina always responded to com-
plaints, so that no government could accuse it of not cooperat-
ing. Argentina realized that failure to cooperate would provide
justification for coercive U.N. action under the authority of
ECOSOC resolution 1235. In addition, Argentina retained an
expensive public relations firm to present a good image to the
world.114 Furthermore, Argentine diplomats lobbied exten-
sively in the capitals of governments that were members of the
Commission and even threatened reprisals, although most of
those threats were kept secret.
Fifth, an unusual alliance between Argentina and the
U.S.S.R. made consensus for U.N. action more difficult to
achieve. Trade relations between Argentina and the U.S.S.R
substantially increased as early as 1974, during a previous Ar-
gentine military government," 5 and continued during the pe-
riod of the Videla junta. The trade relations significantly
increased after the United States imposed a grain embargo in
1979 against the U.S.S.R." 6 The U.S.S.R. and its allies thus
supported Argentina in resisting U.N. action. Furthermore, the
U.S.S.R. generally opposed new U.N. implementation measures
to respond to violations (except as to Chile, Israel, and South
Africa), because of its fear that investigations might be ex-
tended to Eastern Europe. Therefore, Soviet support for Ar-
gentina was consistent with its own policies.
challenged his right to speak. Id at 330. Niall MacDermot, Secretary-General
of the International Commission of Jurists, along with representatives of the
United States and one or two other governments, defended Mignone's right to
represent the International Commission of Jurists and to speak under agenda
item 12 about human rights abuses in Argentina. Id. at 331. Though
Mignone's speech was delayed until later that day in an unsuccessful effort to
avoid publicity, the presentation had a very strong effect on Commission mem-
bers. Id.
114. See, e.g., Omang, Argentina Hires U.S. Company to Improve Image,
Wash. Post, Dec. 28, 1976, at A9, col. 1; B. Marsteller, Report to Argentine
Government, Re: Improving the International Image of Argentina (1978).
115. Novitski, Argentina Seen Becoming Soviet Bloc Industry Base, Wash.
Post, June 9, 1974, at G-7, col. 1.
116. See Flood, U.S. Human Rights Initiative Concerning Argentina, in
THE DIPLOMACY OF HUMAN RiGHTs 129, 136 (D. Newson ed. 1986). Argentina
did join the United States boycott of the Moscow Olympics and voted in the
U.N. General Assembly to condemn the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Id.
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Sixth, the U.S. role shifted when President Reagan suc-
ceeded President Carter. During the Reagan administration
in 1981 the United States was represented at the Commission
by Richard Schifter and Michael Novack, who were newcomers
to the U.N. and were principally concerned with using the U.N.
to pressure Eastern Europe. They did not consider the Argen-
tine case to be critical and they were not important players in
deciding what action to take under the 1503 procedure,
although the United States delegation did join the 1981 consen-
sus for continuing consideration of the case.n 7 In 1982 and
1983, the United States focus was again on Eastern Europe, es-
pecially on Poland, and the United States again merely joined
the consensus to continue the 1503 proceedings against Argen-
tina without urging further action.
In contrast, the Carter administration was more concerned
about the Argentine crisis. For example, the last Carter-ap-
pointed delegate to the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, Je-
rome Shestack, was an effective advocate for the establishment
in March 1980 of the Working Group on Enforced or Involun-
tary Disappearances which was a partial response to the Argen-
tine situation.- 8 Shestack also supported the Commission's
decision to continue consideration of the situation in Argentina
under the secret 1503 procedure.11 9
E. WAR IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC
While the most severe human rights violations ceased in
1979, the war in the South Atlantic brought an end to the mili-
tary government in Argentina. The war in the South Atlantic
between Argentina and the United Kingdom occurred from
April until June 1982.120 The defeat of the Argentine military
forced General Galtieri to resign. Indeed, even before the war,
his government was criticized and weakened by strikes, demon-
117. It is worth noting that on March 17, 1981, President Reagan met with
Retired General Roberto Viola, who was expected to be inaugurated President
of Argentina later that month; and the State Department said that the United
States would not criticize the human rights record of Argentina. Reagan Meets
with Argentine Leader, Minneapolis Trib., March 18, 1981, at 3A, col. 6.
118. See Flood, supra note 116, at 134; Kramer & Weissbrodt, supra note
111, at 20.
119. The 1980 session was the first occasion on which the Commission had
an opportunity to consider the 1503 case. (The Commission had received frag-
mentary information about Argentina under ECOSOC resolution 1235, but as
discussed above, the Commission could not generate a consensus for action.)
120. A. DABAT & L. LORENZANO, ARGENTiNA: THE MALViNAS AND THE
END OF M=UTARY RuLE 99-101 (1984).
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strations, and protests relating to human rights abuses under
the military. 1i2  General Bignone then prepared for elections in
October 1983.1z Despite significant changes in the Argentine
government, the U.N. Commission on Human Rights in Febru-
ary 1983 kept Argentina under consideration in the 1503
process.
President Raul Alfonsin became the new President of Ar-
gentina on December 10, 1983. Finally, in February 1984, the
Commission on Human Rights ended consideration of the Ar-
gentine case under the 1503 process. Argentina, the Philip-
pines, and Uruguay took the unusual step of requesting that all
records pertaining to their countries under the 1503 procedure
be made public.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Inter-American Commission responded much more ef-
fectively to the Argentine situation than the U.N. bodies. The
Commission staff's ability to collect information and initiate ef-
forts to obtain an on-site visit facilitated their prompt response.
The Commission's small membership of seven individuals who
meet two or three times a year also enables it to respond
quickly to evolving human rights problems.n2s The Commission
has thereby developed a record of visiting countries with
human rights problems that is unmatched. 2 4 Unlike the U.N.,
it does not require a consistent pattern of gross violations to un-
dertake a factfinding visit; it need only find that a visit might
121. Id. at 73-76; see also J. MALLOW & M. SEIGSON, AUTHoRITARIANS AND
DEMOcRATs: REGIME TRANSITION IN LATIN AMERICA 15 (1987) (tracing the re-
democratization of Argentina); G. O'DONNELL, P. SCHMITrER & L. WHITE-
HEAD, TRANSITIONS FROM AUTHORITARIAN RULE: PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY
19 (1986) (describing cyclical political landscape in Argentina); Retmer,
Redemocratization and the Impact of Authoritarian Rule in Latin America,
17 CoMP. POL. 253, 256 (1985) (analysis of Latin American countries that have
attempted democracy).
122. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, ARGENTINA: THE MILITARY JUNTAS AND
HUMAN RIGHTS, REPORT OF THE TRIAL OF THE FORMER JUNTA MEMBERS 6
(1987); see also ASPEN INSTITUTE, STATE CRIMES, PUNISHMENT OR PARDON
(1989) (discussing how countries should deal with past human rights violators);
Crawford, Due Obedience and the Rights of Victims: Argentina's Transition
to Democracy, 12 HUM. RTS. Q. 17, 40 (1990) (detailing trial of General
Bignone).
123. At the time of the Argentine case the Commission had resources to
meet three times a year. Recently, fiscal restraint has permitted meetings
only twice a year.
124. See Weissbrodt & McCarthy, Fact-Finding by International Nongov-
ernmental Human Rights Organizations, 22 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 31-34 (1981).
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help resolve complaints that it has received. Arrangement of
the visit and the visit itself both played crucial roles in re-
forming human rights in Argentina. The pro-human rights pol-
icies of the Carter administration also facilitated the
Commission's work.
The Inter-American Commission has a relatively small
staff who are motivated and flexible, and have an independent
process for responding to alleged violations. In contrast, several
U.N. procedures, particularly the procedures under ECOSOC
resolution 1503, are complex and require many steps that are
vulnerable to political influence. Furthermore, the Inter-
American Commission's process is more open than the U.N.
procedure. While the Inter-American Commission published a
full, detailed, and influential report on Argentine human rights
violations, U.N. discussions and decisions were almost entirely
secret under ECOSOC resolution 1503. Indeed, the Inter-
American Commission report formed the factual and policy
foundation for later U.N. action.
The Commission on Human Rights and its Sub-Commis-
sion, with forty-three'2 and twenty-six members respectively,
control the U.N. process. The two bodies meet separately, but
only annually. Both require considerable efforts to obtain a
consensus before action is possible. Visits to countries on be-
half of these U.N. bodies are exceptional. It was the Argentine
situation that finally prompted the U.N. to establish the Work-
ing Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances, one of
the first U.N. human rights bodies to develop a practice of visit-
ing countries where problems exist.
The U.N. undoubtedly responded slowly to the Argentine
case. Furthermore, once the Commission decided to respond by
pursuing the case under the 1503 procedure, their consideration
continued well beyond the time during which the worst viola-
tions occurred. Indeed, most of the disappearances, arrests, and
killings ended before the 1503 process began. By 1982 and 1983,
the principal need was to account for those persons who disap-
peared from 1976 to 1979. Therefore, not only was the Commis-
sion slow to act, but it was also slow to respond to
improvements. The 1503 procedure ended in 1984 only after
President Alfonsin took office. The Working Group on En-
forced or Involuntary Disappearances is still pursuing explana-
tions from Argentina about the disappeared persons.16
125. In 1992 the Commission membership will rise to 53.
126. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has decided that govern-
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This Essay demonstrates the difficulty of identifying ac-
tions that may improve a human rights situation. Many vary-
ing factors may lead to a change. Nonetheless, it is possible to
identify a complex combination of multilateral and bilateral
pressures on the Argentine government, combined with inter-
nal pressures, that helped decrease and ultimately end the
grave violations of human rights prevalent from 1976 to 1979 in
Argentina. Indeed, a comparison of the frequency of disappear-
ances during that period to the activities of nongovernmental
organizations, governments, the Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights, and U.N. bodies shows that the final cutoff
of U.S. military aid to Argentina at the end of September 1978,
and the subsequent Argentine acceptance of the Inter-Ameri-
can Commission on Human Rights visit, coincide with a signifi-
cant decrease in the frequency of disappearances.'2 Having
accepted the Inter-American Commission's visit, the Argentine
government apparently recognized that it had to end the most
virulent of its human rights abuses.
This Essay's conclusion suggests further study for the fu-
ture: if human rights pressures from organizations and govern-
ments were successful in improving human rights in Argentina,
the lessons of this case study must be tested in cases involving
other countries and time periods to determine whether more
general lessons can be drawn from this single case.
POSTSCRIPT
During five months in 1985, nine military leaders were on
trial for specific offenses of the "dirty war." On December 9,
1985, the court issued its verdict. The tribunal sentenced Gen-
eral Jorge Videla and Admiral Emilio Massera, who com-
manded the army and navy, to life in prison. It sentenced two
other participants to a term of years and acquitted the remain-
ing defendants.1 s8 Although hundreds of other prosecutions
were initiated, the Punto Final legislation and the Law of Due
Obedience during the Presidency of Paul Alfonsin ultimately
prevented action against almost all of the more junior officers
ments have an obligation to investigate cases of disappearances "as long as
there is uncertainty about the fate of the person who has disappeared." I/A
Court H.R., Godinez Cruz Case, Judgment of January 20, 1989, Series C No. 5,
at 155. Article 13 of the Draft Declaration on the Protection of All Persons
from Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances contains a similar norm. U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1990/32, at 11, 15 (1990).
127. See K. Sikkink, supra note 1, at 1.
128. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 122, at 76-81.
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and the perpetrators of the most heinous abuses. Human rights
organizations continue to seek information about the fate of
the thousands of disappeared persons whose cases remain
unresolved.
Following President Raul Alfonsin's nearly six year term,
Carlos Menem, a candidate allied with the Peronist Party, was
elected President on May 14, 1989.1" Carlos Menem assumed
office in July 1989, several months ahead of schedule. On Octo-
ber 6, 1989, he pardoned the military officers and civilians who
had been prosecuted, but not convicted, for their role in violat-
ing human rights and undermining democracy during the
"dirty war." In addition, on December 29, 1990, President
Menem pardoned thirty-nine military leaders who remained in
prison after the 1985 trial and other high ranking officers im-
prisoned for crimes during the "dirty war."130
129. According to the Constitution, President Alfonsin could not succeed
himself. He supported Eduardo Angeloz, Governor of C6rdoba Province, who
was the presidential candidate of Alfonsin's Union Civica Radical (UCR) party
who lost the election to Carlos Menem.
130. Amnesty International, Argentina: Presidential Pardon to Military
Officer Before Trial, Weekly Update NWS 8 (Jan. 16, 1991) (AI Index: AMR
13/WU 01/91).
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